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The electric power sector is widely expected to be the linchpin of efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Virtually all credible pathways to climate stabilization entail twin challenges for the electricity sector: cutting emissions nearly to zero (or even net negative emissions) by mid-century, while expanding to electrify and consequently decarbonize a much greater share of global energy use. 1, 2 In light of this fact, a flurry of recent studies has outlined and explored pathways to ''deep decarbonization'' of the power sector, defined here as an 80%-100% reduction in carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions from current levels. Here we review and distill insights from 40 such studies published since the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change review in 2014 (summarized in Table 1 ).
Despite differing methods, scopes, and research questions, several consistent insights emerge from this literature. The studies collectively outline and evaluate two overall paths to decarbonize electricity: one that relies primarily (or even entirely) on variable renewable energy sources (chiefly wind and solar power) supported by energy storage, greater flexibility from electricity demand, and continent-scale expansion of transmission grids; and a second path that relies on a wider range of low-carbon resources including wind and solar as well as ''firm'' resources such as nuclear, geothermal, biomass, and fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage (CCS) (see Sepulveda et al. in the November 2018 issue of this journal 3 ).
Whichever path is taken, we find strong agreement in the literature that reaching near-zero emissions is much more challenging-and requires a different set of low-carbon resources-than comparatively modest emissions reductions (e.g., CO 2 reductions of 50%-70%). This is chiefly because more modest goals can readily employ natural gas-fired power plants as firm resources. Pushing to near-zero emissions requires replacing the vast majority of fossil fueled power plants or equipping them with CCS.
Given the long-lived nature of power sector capital equipment and long gestation period for R&D efforts, it is critical to examine the distinct challenges inherent to deep decarbonization today; a policy of ''muddling through'' is unlikely to produce optimal outcomes. The literature outlines potentially feasible decarbonization solutions, but also clarifies several challenges that must be overcome along each path to a zero-carbon electricity system. In light of these challenges, and the considerable technological uncertainty facing us today, we conclude that a strategy that seeks to improve and expand the portfolio of available low-carbon resources, rather than restrict it, offers a greater likelihood of affordably achieving deep decarbonization.
Failing to Affordably Decarbonize Electricity Could Imperil Global Climate Efforts
Studies considering economy-wide GHG reduction goals consistently envision the power sector cutting emissions further and faster than other sectors of the economy, achieving close to zero (or net negative) emissions in 2050. 2 Because electricity is technically easier and less costly to decarbonize than other sectors, 4 economy-wide studies rely upon expanded generation of carbon-free electricity to meet greater shares of energy demand for heating, industry, and transportation. Across global decarbonization Sectors: E, electricity; T, transport; I, industry; H, heat; W, economy-wide; Methodologies: O, techno-economic cost optimization; I, integrated climate-economic-energy cost optimization; S, scenario-based simulation; A, accounting-based; R, review or inter-model comparison; Long-duration storage, transmission, flexible demand: N, not in any cases; Y, yes in all cases; S, in some sensitivity cases; L, limited interconnection with neighboring region only.To be included in our review, studies had to be published in English and feature one or more scenarios in which the electricity sector reduced CO 2 emissions by more than 80% below contemporary levels. While this review focuses on the electricity sector, we also included a subset of 15 multi-sector or economy-wide studies in order to survey insights regarding the role of the electricity sector within broader mitigation efforts. This is not an exhaustive catalog of all research on this topic, but spans a wide range of studies and is intended to be broad enough to capture the critical insights from recent research.
scenarios produced by 18 modeling groups, for example, electricity demand increases 20%-120% by 2050 (median estimate of 52%) and 120%-440% by 2100; electricity supplies 25%-45% of total energy demand by mid-century and as much as 70% by 2100. 1 In the United States, electricity use could increase 60%-110% by 2050 as electricity (and fuels produced from electricity, e.g., hydrogen) expand from around 20% of final energy demand at present to more than 50% by 2050. 5 In short, scholars agree that the electricity sector must not only decarbonize but also steadily increase its end-use market share through mid-century and beyond. It follows that a failure to deeply decarbonize the power sector would imperil climate mitigation efforts across the broader economy. At the same time, costly routes to decarbonization that substantially increase the price of electricity would make low-carbon electricity a less attractive substitute for oil, natural gas, and coal in transportation, heating, and industry. Finding feasible and affordable routes to decarbonize the power sector thus takes on outsized importance in global climate mitigation efforts.
Renewables May Drive Decarbonization, but Challenges Increase Sharply as Variable Renewable Energy Penetration Approaches 100%
Multiple studies indicate that achieving deep decarbonization primarily or even exclusively with variable renewable energy (VRE) sources may be technically possible. Despite a diversity of contexts and analytical methods, these studies also exhibit a high degree of agreement on several key features of VREcentric power systems that must fall into place for this decarbonization pathway to be feasible and affordable. Most of these features arise from the need to manage the variable nature of wind and solar power, which are the predominant renewable energy sources in most studies because they offer the most abundant resource potential. Importantly, challenges associated with the variability of wind and solar increase nonlinearly as the share of energy from these sources rises. As a result, issues that may be manageable at more modest penetration levels can quickly become significant barriers as VRE shares approach 100% of generation. 6 Continent-Scale Transmission Expansion First, in order to smooth renewable energy variation across wider regions, high-VRE scenarios routinely entail a continent-scale expansion of long-distance transmission capacity. To reach 80% renewable electricity in the United States (with only 50% from wind and solar), for example, a National Renewable Energy Laboratory study proposes a 56%-105% increase in long-distance transmission capacity. 7 Other studies envision tens of thousands of miles of new high-voltage direct-current transmission linking all regions in the United States, while two renewables-focused studies for the European Union see interconnection capacity between EU nations expanding 4-to 9-fold by 2050. 8, 9 The necessary long-distance transmission capacity reported in these studies typically does not include the additional transmission lines needed within each region to access renewable energy sites. As transmission makes up a relatively small share of the cost of delivered electricity in most regions, even a large-scale transmission buildout may have modest impacts on total system costs. 10 However, grid expansion of this magnitude would need to overcome persistent challenges related to siting and cost allocation that frequently prevent (or severely delay) planned transmission infrastructure.
Flexible Demand
In most of the populated regions of the world, the availability of wind and solar energy varies substantially not just on a daily cycle but over weekly, monthly, and seasonal periods. As a result most scenarios highly reliant on wind and solar assume that sources of electricity consumption will become much more flexible and responsive to power system needs in the future. To varying degrees, these scenarios envision reshaping demand to match variable supply, rather than shaping supply to match variable demand, as is commonplace in all power systems today. Electrification of transportation, heating, and industry will increase demand for electricity, as discussed above, but some of these new sources of demand could also become flexible resources that help manage power systems. For example, electric vehicles must be ready when drivers need them, but they are parked most of the time. Smart controls could modulate charging rates (or return power to the grid) to help balance supply and demand while lowering costs for vehicle owners. Thermal inertia in buildings and water tanks can also shift the timing of heating and cooling to some extent without affecting occupancy comfort. 11 The demand flexibility considered in these studies typically helps address daily fluctuations in wind and solar output, rather than multi-week and seasonal resource deficits; the ability and willingness of businesses or households to curtail demand for multi-day periods, weeks, or months are as yet untested.
Inefficient Utilization Requires VeryLow-Cost Wind and Solar to Make Overcapacity Economical Due to their intrinsic variability, relying on very high shares of wind or solar to achieve deep decarbonization involves overbuilding total installed capacity (relative to peak demand) to produce sufficient energy during periods when available wind or solar output is well below average ( Figure 1) . As a corollary, during periods of the year when wind or solar is abundant, available electricity production exceeds total demand in these scenarios. This excess generation must either be curtailed (wasted) or stored for later use. While overgeneration and curtailment are manageable at lower penetration levels, the challenge increases significantly as VRE supply reaches high levels. For example, one study finds that curtailment is negligible if the share of renewables is held to 60% or below, but rises nonlinearly at higher penetrations (Figure 2 ). At 100% renewables, curtailment wastes enough energy (in this study) to meet at least 40% of current annual United States electricity demand, even after assuming continent-scale transmission expansion, flexible demand (in the form of controllable electric vehicle [EV] charging), and widespread deployment of battery energy storage.
Overbuilding capacity and wasting a large fraction of available energy to curtailment results in low utilization rates for wind and solar capacity, especially the marginal capacity installed to reach greater than 80% energy shares. As such, total system costs also rise nonlinearly as renewable energy shares increase toward 100% (Figure 2 ). To counteract this escalation in total costs and keep VRE-dominant routes to electricity decarbonization affordable, capital costs for wind and solar must therefore fall much further than in scenarios where they share the market with a mix of other low-carbon resources.
Either ''Firm'' Generation or ''Seasonal'' Storage Is Needed to Ensure Reliability in Wind-and SolarDominated Scenarios While overgeneration arises during periods of abundant supply, periods of scarce wind or solar production are the flip side of the variability challenge. Prolonged periods of calm wind speeds lasting days or weeks during winter months with low solar insolation are particularly challenging for VRE-dominated systems. These sustained lulls in available wind and solar output are too long to bridge with shorter-duration batteries or flexible demand.
Power systems with high VRE shares consequently require sufficient capacity from reliable electricity sources that can sustain output in any season and for long periods (weeks or longer). This ''firm'' capacity 3 is often provided by augmenting wind and solar with dispatchable generation-e.g., natural gas plants, geothermal, hydropower with large reservoirs, nuclear power, or bioenergy. In high-VRE scenarios, however, these firm resources suffer from a lower utilization rate than they do in more balanced scenarios. This means that resources with low capital costs and high variable costs (e.g., bioenergy, hydrogen, or natural gas fueled power plants) are economically better suited to pair with high wind and solar shares.
Other studies partially or fully replace firm generation with one or more energy storage media capable of sustained output over weeks or longer and suited to low annual utilization rates. No such energy storage options exist at large scale today. Even at $100 per kWh of installed energy capacity (less than a third of today's costs), enough Li-ion batteries to store one week of United States electricity use would cost more than $7 trillion, or nearly 19 years of total United States electricity expenditures. Scenarios that eschew firm generation therefore must rely upon one or more long-term energy storage technologies with an order-of-magnitude lower cost per kWh, including thermal energy storage, production of hydrogen from electrolysis and storage in underground salt caverns or pressurized tanks, or conversion of electrolytic hydrogen to methane. Considerable uncertainty remains about the real-world cost, timing, and scalability of these storage options.
Firm Low-Carbon Resources Can Lower Decarbonization Costs
Most of the challenges associated with very high shares of wind or solar energy can be avoided by adopting a more balanced portfolio of resources. Across decarbonization scenarios that harness variable renewables alongside firm low-carbon generation resourcesincluding nuclear power, coal or natural gas plants with CCS, and greater shares of firm renewable resources such as bioenergy or geothermal power plants-total installed capacity is more closely sized to peak demand, all resources enjoy higher asset utilization, and substantial curtailment of renewable energy output is avoided. None of these scenarios require the longduration ''seasonal'' storage technologies discussed above. Moreover, while all scenarios benefit from cost-effective demand flexibility and transmission expansion, these features have less impact on the cost of decarbonization in more technology-diversified scenarios.
Twenty of the studies surveyed employ techno-economic optimization or integrated assessment modeling techniques to find the most affordable path to deep decarbonization and considered one or more scalable, firm low-carbon resources (beyond geothermal energy and existing reservoir hydropower, which are severely constrained in most models due to available sites suitable for expansion). Notably, all of these studies include a substantial share of firm low-carbon generation in their lowest cost resource portfolio (see Table 1 ). In other words, firm low-carbon resources are a consistent feature of the most affordable pathways to deep decarbonization of electricity.
However, all currently available firm low-carbon energy sources face challenges that may impede adoption at the scale or pace desired for climate stabilization. 12 Worldwide, deployment of new nuclear power is barely keeping pace with retirement of aging reactors, while high-profile cost overruns and bankruptcies have plagued nuclear construction in the United States and Europe. Carbon-capture technologies continue to make progress at the demonstration scale, but commercial deployment remains nearly nonexistent. Furthermore, while solid biomass use is rapidly increasing, driven particularly by renewable energy policies in Europe, researchers have raised serious questions about the net life-cycle greenhouse gas benefits of biomass from both managed forests and dedicated energy crops. Reservoir hydropower systems are mature, but new construction is geographically limited and entails substantial environmental impact, including the release of methane. 13 Conventional geothermal energy technologies are constrained to locations with ideal geological conditions, while enhanced or engineered geothermal systems, which could unlock widespread resource potential, are pre-commercial.
Expanding and Improving the LowCarbon Electricity Portfolio Increases Chances of Affordable Decarbonization Given the challenges now facing available firm low-carbon resources, it is tempting for policymakers, socially conscious businesses, and research efforts to bet exclusively on today's apparent winners: solar photovoltaics (PV), wind, and battery energy storage. That would be a mistake.
As this review indicates, several obstacles must be overcome to cost-effectively decarbonize electricity regardless of whether wind and solar are expected to deliver the vast majority of electricity or we pursue a more diverse portfolio of resources. We cannot assume that public opposition and siting challenges for new, continent-spanning transmission networks can be overcome; that flexible demand will be unlocked at sufficient scale; that wind and solar PV will continue deep and sustained cost declines; or that order-of-magnitude cheaper ''seasonal'' storage technologies will become widely scalable. Any one of these things may well happen, but it is far less likely all will be simultaneously achieved.
Assume hypothetically that each of these four key outcomes (grid expansion, flexible demand, very-low-cost wind and solar, and seasonal storage) has the same odds as rolling a dice and not coming up with a 1. Despite this five-out-of-six chance for each individual outcome, the joint probability of all four occurring (0.833 4 ) would be just 48%-effectively a coin flip.
Given the high stakes, it would be prudent to expand and improve a wide set of clean energy resources, each of which may fill the critical niche for firm, low-carbon power should other technologies falter. For example, nuclear power, CCS, bioenergy, and enhanced geothermal energy each have the ability to fill the firm role in a low-cost, low-carbon portfolio. Assume that each resource has only a 50% probability of becoming affordable and scalable within the next two decades. If all four options are pursued, however, the odds that at least one succeeds (1-0.5 4 ) would be 94%.
A strategy that supported the development of all low-carbon options, both firm and variable, would raise the chance of success of at least one affordable pathway to decarbonize electricity to 97% (using the hypothetical odds given above).
These examples are purely illustrative, but the logic is critical. Eschewing the development of firm low-carbon technologies because they face challenges today would amount to betting the planet on the assumption that all of the conditions needed for an affordable wind and solar-centered path to decarbonize electricity will fall into place. Supporting an expanded and diversified portfolio of clean energy options that can substitute for one another hedges the risk of technology failure and substantially improves the chances of achieving a zero-carbon energy system.
Obstacles remain along any path to zero-carbon electricity, and the true probabilities of success are unknowable. It is therefore vitally important that decision makers identify and pursue prudent strategies to improve the odds of feasible and cost-effective decarbonization.
